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Summary 
Exhaustion of a natural resource stock may be a rational choice for an individual and/or 
a community, even if a sustainable use for the resource is feasible and the resource users 
are farsighted and well informed on the ecosystem. We identify conditions under which 
it is optimal not to sustain resource use. These conditions concern the discounting of 
future benefits, instability of social system or ecosystem, nonconvexity of natural 
growth function, socio-psychological value of employment, and strategic interaction 
among resource users. The identification of these conditions can help design policies to 
prevent unsustainable patterns of resource use. 
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1. Introduction 
Sustainability has long been a primary objective of renewable resource management. The notion of 
sustained yield goes back to at least the 18th century European forestry (Carlowitz 1713. Also see 
Vanclay 1996). After the publication of “Our Common Future” by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED 1987) and the United Nation Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, the concept of sustainability has been popularized and 
regarded as one of the basic social goals. At the same time, most scholars have recognized the 
vagueness of the concept, raising questions such as: Is it to keep physically intact a natural resource 
or environmental asset? If so, how should one think about the sustainability of a nonrenewable 
resource? How does it relate to intergenerational equity and intertemporal efficiency? Not 
surprisingly, economists have come to various definitions of sustainability and differing views about 
their merits. (See, for example, Pearce et al. 1990; Turner et al. 1994; Nordhaus, 1994; Solow, 1998; 
Heal 1999; Farzin, 2004.) 
Whatever the definition of sustainability, it is obvious that finite-time resource extinction 
defies sustainability. In this paper, we show how a rational agent willingly exhausts a resource in a 
finite time, even though a sustainable resource use is feasible, or, at least, the resource could be used 
up over an infinitely long period. The assumption of rationality is important: it enables us to avoid an 
unsustainable path of resource use by removing the very conditions that render finite-time extinction 
rational. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to identify the conditions under which finite-time 
exhaustion of a renewable resource is optimal. These conditions concern (a) the discounting of 
future benefits, (b) uncertainty about the future of the resource stock, (c) nonconvexity of natural 
growth function, (d) socio-psychological aspect of work incentives, and (e) strategic interaction 
among resource users. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces a simple model for resource 
management to show that heavy discounting makes finite-time extinction optimal. We show that a 
source of a high discount rate could be the uncertainty about the future ecological state of the 
resource stock or about its future ownership and management. In Section 3, we modify the model by   3
allowing nonconvexity in the resource’s natural growth function. If an inbreeding depression or an 
Alee effect exists, the growth function takes a shape that it is convex when the population size 
(resource stock) is small and concave when it is large. We will see that even with a low discount rate, 
if the initial stock of the resource is small, the optimal path is finite-time exhaustion. In Section 4, 
the model is extended to incorporate socio-psychological value of employment. We show that even 
with a low discount rate and an abundant resource stock, finite-time exhaustion becomes optimal. 
This is because in this case it is optimal for the resource user to harvest the resource at the maximum 
harvesting ability. This is an extreme case of extinction: the most rapid extinction. In Section 5, we 
consider a common property resource problem, assuming that multiple agents use the resource. 
Again, we show that the most rapid extinction is optimal for each individual resource user.   At the 
same time, we show that, under the same condition, sustainable resource use is optimal too. However, 
one cannot be sure which optimal path is adopted. Section 6 concludes with some policy 
implications of these findings. 
 
 
2. Discounting and Uncertainty 
Let us start with a rudimentary model in resource economics, characterized by the following 
problem: 
0 ()0 max ( ( ))
t
ct uct e d t
ρ ∞ −
≥ ∫  (1.a) 
s u b j e c t  t o   () ( () ) () , x tf x tc t = − &  (1.b) 
                 0 ( ), ( ) 0, (0)   given. xt ct x x ≥=  (1.c) 
Here  x   denotes the stock of a renewable resource. The natural growth of the resource is described 
by function : f + → RR . Variable () ct denotes the amount of harvest at timet . Therefore, the 
evolution of the resource stock is described by equation (1.b), where () x t & denotes the time derivative 
of () x t . The consumption of harvest yields utility to the resource user according to the utility 
function : u + → RR . We assume that the natural growth function f is hump-shaped and strictly   4
concave, and the utility functionu is bounded from below, strictly increasing and strictly concave. 
See Figure 1. Formally, we make the following assumptions: 
[Assumption 1]     : f + → RR satisfies (0) ( ) 0, 0, 0 ff KK f ′′ = =>< . 




The objective of the resource user is to maximize the sum of his discounted utilities from 
the present time to infinite future, as seen in the objective functional (1.a). The discount rateρ is the 
user’s time preference parameter. Ifρ is zero, the user values the utilities equally between now and 
any time in future, whereas if it is positive, the utilities in future are valued less than the present 
utility. In particular, by the power of discounting, the present value of the well-being of a generation 
living in a far distant future is almost negligible. This implies that the choice of a discount rate raises 
an ethical problem for intergenerational equity. In fact, in the seminal paper which initiated dynamic 
analysis in economics, Frank Ramsey, who was a philosopher and mathematician as well as 
economist, wrote that [discounting] is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of 
the imagination (Ramsey 1928). It should be noted, however, that discounting could be rationalized 
from a non-ethical standpoint. It is known that there is no (lifetime) utility function which satisfies 
Pareto criterion and intergenerational equity in an infinite time horizon model (Basu and Mitra 2003. 
Also see Svensson 1980, Diamond, 1965; Koopmans, 1960). Pareto criterion is minimum essential 
requirement for rational decision making. For a discounting model ( 0 ρ > ), the lifetime utility 
function is well defined and satisfies the Pareto criterion, but does not satisfy the intergenerational 
equity. For now, let us assume a positive discount rate 0 ρ > . Later, we will justify it for a 
non-ethical reason: uncertainty. 
In order to obtain finite-time extinction as an optimal path, we make an additional 
assumption: 
[Assumption 3]   
00 lim ( )  and lim ( )
xc fx r u c ′′ = <∞ <∞

.   5
While the finiteness of the intrinsic growth rater is quite plausible, the assumption for the utility 
function is relatively restrictive, because it rules out the case where  cis an essential good like water 
or oxygen. If your consumption of water decreases to zero, the value of one unit of water for 
you, () uc ′ , will rise up to infinity. Therefore, you will never exhaust the source of water. This 
explains the necessity of this assumption for optimal finite-time resource exhaustion. However, in a 
setup with multiple resource users, as in Section 5, finite-time resource extinction could be optimal 
without this assumption. 
To solve the rudimentary problem, it is a routine to define the (maximized) Hamiltonian 
*2 : H + → RR  as 
  *( , ) max[ ( ) ( ( ) )| 0], Hx u c f xc c λ λ =+ − ≥  (2) 
whereλ is called the costate variable. By Pontryagin’s maximum principle, there is a nonnegative 
function of time () t λ , with which the optimal control
*() ctand the optimal state 
*() x t  satisfy  (2), 
and 
  *( , )/ , xH x λ λ = ∂∂ &  (3.a) 
  *( , )/ , Hx x λρ λ λ = −∂ ∂ &  (3.b) 
on the interior of the domain of 
* H . The system of autonomous differential equations (3) is called 
(modified) Hamiltonian dynamics. This system is rewritten as 
 
[]













− ′ is the inverse function ofu′ . The phase diagram of this system is depicted as Figure 2. A 
solution path is optimal if it converges to a steady state, by Arrow’s sufficiency theorem.
1 From  this, 
it follows that the interior steady state, which satisfies () fx
ρ ρ ′ = , is an optimal steady state (OSS). 
This interior OSS exists if the intrinsic growth rate exceeds the discount rate: 
 
0 (l i m( ) ) .





                                                  
1    See, for example, Dockner et al. 2000, Chapter 3.   6
 
Figure 2 Panel (a) illustrates this case, where every optimal path converges to the unique interior 
OSS. Thus, the optimal resource use is sustainable. 
If the discount rate is too high to satisfy inequality (4), the interior OSS disappears. The 
phase diagram for this case is drawn in Figure 2 Panel (b). Still, an optimal path for each initial 
stock 0 x   exists and it is unique.
2  Furthermore, the optimal path is monotone (Hartl 1987). Therefore, 
the path converging to
1 (, ) ( 0 , ( 0 ) ) xu λ
− ′ =  is the unique optimum. Along the optimal path, the 
resource stock decreases and eventually becomes extinct. The extinction occurs in a finite time, since 
1(0) u
− ′ takes a finite value and the time derivatives of the Hamiltonian dynamics do not degenerate 
at the limit point:  0, 0 x λ ≠≠ & & at
1 (0, (0)) u
− ′ . Therefore, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: For the rudimentary problem (1) with Assumptions 1-3, if the discount rate exceeds 
the intrinsic growth rate, finite-time extinction is optimal for the resource user. 
 
As mentioned before, the choice of discount rate raises an ethical problem: that is, how 
should we value the well-being of future generations? Another problem is that if idiosyncratic 
preferences are the underlying cause of unsustainable resource use, then there is little one can do to 
prevent extinction without regulating the resource harvesting in some fashion. However, 
independently of any ethical argument, there is another reason for discounting; that is, uncertainty 
about the future of the resource stock or its ownership. Imagine that a sudden disaster completely 
destroys the resource, or the resource owner is suddenly deprived of his ownership by, say, 
confiscation of the resource stock by a corrupt or politically radical government.
3  
We assume that this sort of fatal event occurs with a positive probability. Formally, we 
suppose that the agent does not discount future utilities at all. Instead, the parameterρ  expresses 
                                                  
2    For the proof of the existence, see Magill 1981. The uniqueness follows from the strictly concavity of 
the functions  and  f u . 
3    Note that for environmental conservation or other reasons, a politically radical government may 
suddenly impose a resource tax whose rate is sufficiently high and/or increases steadily at a constant 
proportional rate. It will have the equivalent effect as a stochastic resource confiscation/catastrophe, and 
as shown here, it will cause finite-time exhaustion to be optimal.   7
the arrival rate of the Poisson process for the occurrences of the fatal event. Once the fatal event 
occurs, the utility levels of the resource user thereafter are zero forever. Note that the probability 
with which the event occurs from 0 t = tot τ =  is1 e
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where stochastic variable T is the time at which a fatal event occurs andE is the expectation 
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The last equality holds since every feasible consumption path satisfies 
[ ] limsup ( ) max ( )| 0 t ct f x x →∞ ≤≥  and there exists  u < ∞ such that  0 esssup ( ( )) t uct u ≥ ≤  
for each feasible () ct . Note 
0 lim ( ( )) lim /
T TT
TT e u c t dt uT e
ρ ρ −




→∞ = =  
After all, we are back to the rudimentary problem (1), although nowρ expresses the 
magnitude of the probability of the fatal event. We interpret this result as the following corollary: 
 
Corollary of Proposition 1: Finite-time extinction may be optimal, if the ecosystem and/or the 
socio-political system is so unstable that the probability of the arrival of the ecological catastrophe 
or socio-political upheaval is so high as to exceed the intrinsic growth rate, r ρ > . 
 
 
                                                  
4    See, for example, Dasgupta and Heal (1979).   8
3. Nonconvexity of a Natural Growth Function 
In this section, we focus on the natural growth function. A concave growth function implies that the 
natural growth rates increase as the size of the resource stock decreases. However, if the stock size is 
very small, the growth rate may be small, for example, due to an Alee effect or an inbreeding 




Consider the rudimentary problem (1) with modification of Assumption 1 as follows: 
[Assumption 4] 
0 ( 0 )0 ,  l i m( ) ,   0 :() ,( )( ) 0  i f   ( ). II I x f fx x fx fx x x ρ ρ
→




Figure 4 illustrates the associated phase diagram. There are two stock levels at which the 
slope of the growth function coincides to discount rateρ . The larger onex
ρ corresponds to the OSS 
for the original rudimentary model (1). The smaller onexρ is new. It is readily seen thatxρ and the 
associated costateλ constitute another steady state of the Hamiltonian dynamics (3). However, it can 
be shown thatxρ is not an OSS.
5 Also notice that it is ambiguous whetherx
ρ is an OSS, due to the 
nonconvexity of the growth function. Even the existence of optimal paths is a subtle problem for a 
nonconvex problem. However, they exist if we impose a certain growth condition for the evolution 
of the resource stock (See Romer 1987). Furthermore, it can be shown that every optimal path is 
monotonic (See Long et al. 1997). Then, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2:  Suppose the existence of optimal paths. Under Assumption 4, there exists a 
                                                  
5  It can be shown that given the initial point 0 (,( 0 ) ) x λ , the lifetime utility induced by the Hamiltonian 
dynamics coincides with 0 *( , (0))/ Hx λ ρ . By construction,  * H is a strictly convex function in  λ . 
Therefore, the lifetime utility is minimized by staying the lower steady state xρ .   9
threshold (0, ] c x ∈∞ such that if 0 ()c x x <> , the optimal state trajectory monotonically converges 
to  0 (x
ρ ). Furthermore, the threshold satisfies c x x
ρ < , if the following mild discounting condition 
holds: 
  max[ ( )/ | 0] fx xx ρ < ≥ . 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the optimal paths. Even with a very low discount rate, in the presence 
of non-concavity of natural growth function, finite-time extinction may be optimal if the resource 
stock has been already degraded (by, for example, overexploitation so far) below the critical 





4. Non-Pecuniary Value of Employment: A Socio-Psychological Aspect 
It is natural to think that working is not only a means of earning income, but also a form of social 
involvement. Because of this, unemployment usually brings a person unhappiness more than loss of 
income does, which may include, for example, losses of dignity, confidence and identity. In other 
words, there is a non-pecuniary value of employment. Curiously enough, this fact has been ignored 
in traditional economics until recently. Farzin and Akao (2005) incorporate this socio-psychological 
aspect explicitly into a bio-economic model and find that the optimal resource use may be finite-time 
extinction. In this section, we introduce their results with a simpler model than theirs. 
We modify the utility part of the rudimentary problem (1) as follows:   
[Assumption 5]    
22 ( , ),  [0, ],   working time.  / 0, / 0. ucE E E E u E u E ∈= ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ <  
The utility stems from two sources. One is consumption of harvests as before. The other source is 
                                                  
6    “DNS” is the initials of three authors, Dechert, Nishimura, and Skiba. Skiba (1978) first introduced the 
convex-concave production function in the theory of optimal growth in economics. A rigorous analysis 
for a discrete time model is given by Dechert and Nishimura (1983). Gustav Feichtinger and his 
collaborators have recently studied the continuous time models and their applications. See, for example, 
Deissenberg et al. (2001) and Hartl et al. (2004), which contain the literature review in economic 
dynamics with nonconvexity, including environmental economics.   10
working. Different from a standard economic model, here working is not a source of disutility, but a 
source of utility. Although this assumption may seem curious, Farzin and Akao (2004) show that 
non-pecuniary value of work exceeds the value of leisure at very low income levels. 
  Assume that all the labor is used to extract the resource, which is the case where there is 
no alternative employment other than resource extraction. The relationship between labor 
inputE and resource outputcis described with the cost function () E c . There is an upper bound for 
working timeE , which limits the maximum harvest level. Denote the maximum harvest level byH , 
which satisfies () EE H = . We assume that with the maximum effortE , the resource is certainly 
exhausted in a finite time: 
[Assumption 6]  The maximum harvest level with full employment exceeds the maximum 
sustained yield (MSY):  () MSY Hf x > , where MSY x is the solution of  max[ ( )| 0] fx x ≥ ).  
It is important to notice that even though working is a source of utility, the full 
employmentE is  not necessarily an optimal choice. This is because the full employment may 
degrade the resource too much to allow sustaining future consumptions. Recall that we have 
supposed that the resource user is rational enough and in particular farsighted. 
  Although it is mathematically invariant, let us add a flavor of macro economics to the 
rudimentary model (1). Consider a community, in which the local people are governed by a 
benevolent government. Everyone has identical preferences and the same harvesting technology, as 
described above. Letn be the population size. The problem of the benevolent government is:   
  []
0 ()0 max ( ), ( ( ))
t
ct uct Ect e d t
ρ ∞ −
≥ ∫  (7.a) 
      subject to  ( ) ( ( )) ( ), x tf x tn c t = − &  (7.b) 
                         0 0 ( ) ,   (0)  given. Ec H x x ≤≤ =  (7.c) 
 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle suggests that an optimal control * c maximizes the Hamiltonian: 
  ( , , ) ( ) [ ( ) ] , where  ( ) [ , ( )]. Hcx Uc fx n c Uc ucEc λ λ =+ − =  
Assume that the reduced form utility functionU is strictly convex. The following example shows   11
that such a convex utility function is obtained with standard assumptions in economics, if we allow 
working to be a source of utility. 
 
[Example] 
Let utility function have a form of (, ) ucE cE
α η = , with01 α < < and01 η α < <−  (so thatu is 
concave and increasing, a standard assumption of economics). The harvesting technology is 
expressed by () Ec c
β = , with 1 β > , which is also a standard assumption of economics: a cost 
function is convex and increasing. If the elasticity of marginal utility of employment is sufficiently 
high to satisfy () 1/ β αη >− , then  () [, () ] Uc ucEc c
α βη + == is strictly convex 
(
22 /0 dU d c > ). 
 
If
22 /0 dU d c > , the maximum of the Hamiltonian is attained at a corner ofc. That is, the 
optimal control * c is either of the full harvesting  * cH = or no harvesting *0 c = . Also, notice that 
there is no interior optimal control and thus no interior OSS. Therefore, the optimal path of the 
resource stock converges either to the carrying capacity or to zero. It is, however, obvious that the 
path going to the carrying capacity is suboptimal, because there is no chance to harvest at all. 
Therefore, we have: 
 
Proposition 3: Under Assumptions 5 and 6, if 
22 [, () ] / 0 ducEc d c > , full employment is always 




In Farzin and Akao’s framework, if the harvest level with full employment exceeds the MSY, full 
employment and sustainable resource management are incompatible objectives, and the former is 
chosen over the latter as the optimal policy. Population growth and technological progress in 
resource extraction may bring about such a situation. The optimal path has two novelties. First, the 
                                                  
7  The formal proof, including the existence of an optima path, is found in Farzin and Akao (2005).   12
optimal resource extinction is an extreme one, the most rapid extinction.
8 Second, resource 
extinction is optimal irrespective of the state of the resource stock and the magnitude of the discount 
rate. Notice that in this section, we have referred neither to the discount rate nor to the initial level of 




5. Strategic Interaction 
In this section, we consider a natural resource used by multiple users, who are not cooperative.
9 
Such a resource may be categorized by its physical property into two types. The first type is a 
resource for which it is difficult to establish a definite property right. The global atmosphere, 
underground aquifers, and highly migratory fish stocks are few examples. The second type is a 
resource which, although its private or governmental holding is physically possible, is owned 
communally for institutional or historical reasons. An example is the high seas defined in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Another example is a local communal forest in Japan, 
which is a relic of the Edo era (1603-1868), at which private ownership of a forest was prohibited.   
We will show that for those resources, finite-time extinction may be optimal from the 
viewpoint of each resource user, despite the fact that it is by no means socially or cooperatively 
optimal. In other words, we will see the individual optimality of the so-called “tragedy of the 
commons.” We also show that a sustainable resource use can be individually an optimal path, 
although it differs from a socially optimal path. Therefore, the tragedy of the commons is not an 
inevitable destiny. This could explain the fact that some communal resources have been managed in 
a sustainable way, at least apparently and so far. 
A fundamental change from the previous models is that not a single agent but many agents 
use the resource. We assume that the number of resource users  2 n ≥  is fixed. In terminology of 
                                                  
8  Without invoking non-pecuniary value of employment, we could obtain the most rapid extinction as an 
optimal path. It is necessary, however, to specify the utility and natural growth functions that satisfy the 
restrictive conditions derived by Spence and Starrett (1975). Heavy discounting is also needed. 
9    We have used “not cooperative” as a synonym of “individually rational.”   13
economics, this sort of resource is called a common property resource or a common pool resource.
10 
The resource users are identical in their preferences and harvesting technology. As in the previous 
section, there exists the upper bound of the harvest ability (/ ) 0 hH n = > . Modifying the 
rudimentary model (1), we study the following differentiable game model: 
0 ()0 max ( ( ))
t
ct uct e d t
ρ ∞ −
≥ ∫  (8.a) 
      subject to  ( ) ( ( )) ( 1) ( ) ( ), x t f xt n x ct σ = −− − &  (8.b) 
  0                  ( ) [0, ],  (0)  given. ct h x x ∈=  (8.c) 
Let us introduce a few terms of differential game theory. A strategy is a way to harvest. 
While strategy is a quite broad concept, we restrict our analysis to stationary Markovian strategy. 
“Stationary” means that the strategy is time independent. “Markovian” means that the strategy is a 
function of the resource stockx . An example of stationary Markovian strategy () x σ is the most 
rapid extinction strategy: 
 
0







= ⎨ = ⎩
, (9) 
which harvests with the maximum effort as far as the resource exists. When the other players use a 
Markovian strategy () x σ , the problem for each user is written as in (8) above. If the optimal 
solution is described by the same strategy () x σ , it is said that  () x σ constitutes a symmetric 
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (shortly, MPNE). It is a Nash equilibrium, because once all users 
choose the strategy, then no one wants to change the strategy. “Perfect” implies that the equilibrium 
is subgame perfect. In other words, the strategy is strongly time consistent in the sense that even if 
some players deviate from the equilibrium strategy, the equilibrium strategy is still optimal as far as 
the players return to the equilibrium strategy. Finally, it is symmetric since all users take the same 
                                                  
10  Another resource modeling with multiple users is that of an open access resource problem, for which 
the number of the users varies. Anonymous agents freely enter to extract the resource, until their temporal 
profits equilibrate to zero. For this setup, the mechanism causing finite-time extinction is quite simple. 
That is, it occurs if the aggregate harvest levels corresponding to zero profit always exceed the natural 
growth rates of the resource (Berck 1979).    Also, notice that an open access resource problem can be 
regarded as the limit case of the problem (1) withρ →∞ (Beddington  et al. 1975). Therefore, we omit 
this problem in this paper.   14
strategy. For analytical simplicity, we will restrict our concern to the class of symmetric MPNEs. 
Notice that the problem of each resource user now becomes more complicated than the ones in the 
previous sections, because other users also harvest the resource and their harvest rates affect the 
user’s action, which affects, in turn, other users’ actions. This is the strategic interaction. 
The cooperative or social optimization problem, compared with non-cooperative problem 
(8), is formulated as follows: 
0 ()0 max ( ( ))
t
ct uct e d t
ρ ∞ −
≥ ∫  
       0 subject  to ( ) ( ( )) ( ), ( ) [0, ], (0)   given. xt f xt n ct ct h x x =− ∈ = &  
Maintain Assumptions 1, 2, and 
[Assumption 7]   
0 lim ( ) .
x fx ρ ′ >

 
It is easily verified that every optimal cooperative path of the resource stock monotonically 
converges to a unique social OSS,  0 x
ρ > , such that () fx
ρ ρ ′ =  (See Figure 1). Therefore, the 
cooperative solution is sustainable. 
We want to show that finite-time exhaustion is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. individuals’ 
rational choice. To do so, unlike the previous section, we do not need Assumption 3 (the finiteness of 














>− > = ≤ >
′
 
The first inequality is the same assumption as Assumption 6 in the previous section. That is, with the 
maximum harvesting effort, the resource is exhausted in a finite time. The second inequality ensures 
that if other users harvest the resource with the maximum effort, there is no way for an individual 
user to sustain the social OSS  x
ρ . The third and forth inequalities restrict the curvature of utility 
function. These assumptions are technical, but standard in economics. 
The following proposition on equilibrium resource use is given by Gerhard Sorger (1998). 
   15
Proposition 4 (Sorger, 1998): (a) The most rapid extinction strategy (9) constitutes a MPNE if and 




() e x p .
() ( )
x uh d y
uh
nh f x nh f y
ρ
ρ ρ
⎡ ⎤ ′ ≥− ⎢ ⎥ −− ⎣ ⎦ ∫  (10) 
(b) There is a continuum of the other MPNE strategies if () () f xn f x x
ρ ρρ ′ > . Each strategy is 
sustainable in the sense that the associated equilibrium path of the resource stock converges to a 
positive stock level in(0, ) x
ρ .  
 
We refer to the strategy in Proposition 4(b) as Sorger’s strategy. Interestingly, there is a 
pair of a Sorger’s strategy and the initial resource stock with which the associated equilibrium path 
of the resource stock stays in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the social OSS x
ρ for an 
arbitrarily long time. This implies that if a “good” Sorger’s strategy is chosen and if the initial stock 
of the resource lies sufficiently nearx
ρ , the lifetime utility of each resource user is approximately 
the same as would be with the social optimum. Eventually, the stock diminishes to less thanx
ρ , 
though.  
In contrast, the most rapid extinction is the worst strategy, from the viewpoint of 
sustainability. The inequality in Proposition 4(a) holds when the number of usersn is large, the 
maximum harvest rateh is high, or the discount rate of each user  ρ is high. In any of the cases, 
finite-time extinction is optimal from an individual’s viewpoint. 
A troublesome, but interesting, point is that we cannot predict which equilibrium is chosen, 
since all MPNEs are subgame perfect. Furthermore, the most rapid extinction may coexist with 
Sorger’s strategies as equilibrium strategy. This is illustrated in Figure 6 with the following 
specification: the utility function is isoelastic, the natural growth function is described by a logistic 
equation, and  ρ is fixed at a rather low level, since we have already seen how heavy discounting 
brings finite-time extinction. In Figure 6, there are two areas: one is the area on which Sorger’s 
strategies constitute equilibria and the other is the area on which the most rapid extinction strategy 




  The coexistence of the equilibrium strategies means that the resource use for a common 
property resource is ambiguous and unstable. It is possible on a theoretical ground, that for two 
communities with the same conditions, one uses its natural resource in a sustainable way, whereas 
the other exhausts its resource with the most rapid speed. Also, it is possible that a community which 
was using its resource in a sustainable way until yesterday suddenly starts a ruinous resource use 
path without any evident trigger. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We conclude these observations with their policy implications. 
First, we have seen how uncertainty raises discount rate and how a high discount rate 
brings finite-time resource extinction. To prevent such a situation, we need to mitigate the risk of the 
fatal events. For example, political stability matters. Furthermore, such a policy should be 
implemented early on, if the growth function of the resource exhibits nonconvexity and the resource 
is being degraded. This is because when the resource has been already degraded, finite-time 
extinction is more prone to be an optimal resource use policy even with a low discount rate. 
Second, we have seen that non-pecuniary value of employment makes people give priority 
to full employment over sustainable resource use. Farzin and Akao (2005) show that the remedy is 
none but to create alternative employment sources to absorb labor force which is excessive from the 
viewpoint of sustainable resource use. They also suggest that earlier policy implementation is more 
prudent, since when the resource is more degraded, higher wage rates may be necessary to prevent 
resource exhaustion. 
Third, we have seen a strategic interaction cause the most rapid extinction, which is an 
extreme case of a finite-time resource extinction. Although all common property resources do not   17
have such a fate as predicted by Garrett Hardin (1968), all of them share the possibility. Breaking 
such an interaction is the primal policy to prevent the most rapid extinction. Akao (2001, 2004) 
shows that among standard economic policy measures, a tax on harvest does not work, whereas 
tradable permits or quota system works well, because it establishes property rights to resource use. 
Another prospective prescription is privatization. However, a caution is given by Dasgupta and 
Maler (1997). They have pointed out that, in the real world, the consequence of privatization of a 
common property resource may be further resource degradation. This is due to the existing 
inequality in a rural community. If the resource is not favorably distributed to the poor, they cannot 
help but to encroach on the resource. 
Finally, resource-sector technological assistance and income assistance may not help to 
prevent finite-time extinction. In particular, if a technological assistance improves the harvesting 
efficiency, and hence the maximum harvesting ability, it may even accelerate resource extinction. 
 
 
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2 
Suppose c x does not exist. Then, every optimal path converges to x
ρ by its monotonicity. The 
monotonicity also implies that there is an interval(0, ] x % such that the optimal control is zero 
harvesting (a corner solution) while the resource stock stays in the interval. The situation is depicted 
in Figure 7. Let () Vx be the optimal value function, that is, the lifetime utility gained when the 
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where  0 () Tx is the arrival time atx % . Let  0 (; ) tx λ be the optimal costate at time  t   when the initial 
stock is  0. x  Since 0 () Vx is twice continuously differentiable,  00 (0; ) ( ) x Vx λ ′ = (See Arrow and 
Kurz, 1970). By (5),  00 0 () () /() Vx V x fx ρ ′ = . Combine these and take the limit, 0 0 x  . Using 
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exists and finite (see the phase diagram in Figure 5), the equality in (6) holds if 
and only if
0
0 0 lim ( )
x fx ρ ′ =

, which contradicts Assumption 4. The second part of the proposition is 
proved as follows: Let  argmax[ ( )/ | 0] MSY xf x x x =≥ . The mild discounting condition implies 
that MSY x xρ < . Consider a new growth function () f x % , 
which is defined by the convex hull of the graph(, () ) x fx . Since () ()  a l l   0 fx fx x ≤ ≥ % , an 
optimal control for the problem (1) with () f x % is optimal for the problem with () f x , if the control is 
feasible with () f x . It is easily seen that these two problems share the optimal path in a 
neighborhood of  x
ρ , which is the OSS when the growth function () f x % . 
                ( Q . E . D . )  
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Figure 3 Convex-concave natural growth function.   25
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Figure 6 Coexistence of sustainable and unsustainable equilibria.   28
 
 








0 xNOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 










NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2006 
    
SIEV 1.2006  Anna ALBERINI: Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in Voluntary Cleanup Programs: 
The Case of Colorado 
CCMP 2.2006  Valentina BOSETTI, Carlo CARRARO and Marzio GALEOTTI:  Stabilisation Targets, Technical Change and the 
Macroeconomic Costs of Climate Change Control 
CCMP 3.2006  Roberto ROSON: Introducing Imperfect Competition in CGE Models: Technical Aspects and Implications 
KTHC 4.2006  Sergio VERGALLI: The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics 
SIEV 5.2006  Fabio GRAZI, Jeroen C.J.M. van den BERGH and Piet RIETVELD: Modeling Spatial Sustainability: Spatial 
Welfare Economics versus Ecological Footprint 
CCMP 6.2006  Olivier DESCHENES and Michael GREENSTONE: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from 
Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in Weather 
PRCG 7.2006  Michele MORETTO and Paola VALBONESE: Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach 
SIEV 8.2006  Anna ALBERINI and Aline CHIABAI: Discount Rates in Risk v. Money and Money v. Money Tradeoffs 
CTN 9.2006  Jon X. EGUIA: United We Vote 
CTN 10.2006  Shao CHIN SUNG and Dinko DIMITRO: A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games 
NRM 11.2006  Fabio CERINA (lxxviii): Tourism Specialization and Sustainability: A Long-Run Policy Analysis 
NRM 12.2006  Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxxviii): Benchmarking in Tourism 
Destination, Keeping in Mind the Sustainable Paradigm 
CCMP 13.2006  Jens HORBACH: Determinants of Environmental Innovation – New Evidence from German Panel Data Sources
KTHC 14.2006  Fabio SABATINI:  Social Capital, Public Spending and the Quality of Economic Development: The Case of Italy
KTHC 15.2006  Fabio SABATINI: The Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Perspective 
CSRM 16.2006  Giuseppe DI VITA:  Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence 
CCMP 17.2006  Rob B. DELLINK and Marjan W. HOFKES: The Timing of National Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions in 
the Presence of Other Environmental Policies 
IEM 18.2006  Philippe QUIRION: Distributional Impacts of Energy-Efficiency Certificates Vs. Taxes and Standards 
CTN 19.2006  Somdeb LAHIRI: A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems 
CCMP 20.2006  Massimiliano MAZZANTI  and Roberto ZOBOLI: Examining the Factors Influencing Environmental 
Innovations  
SIEV 21.2006  Y. Hossein FARZIN and Ken-ICHI AKAO: Non-pecuniary Work Incentive and Labor Supply 
CCMP 22.2006  Marzio GALEOTTI, Matteo MANERA and Alessandro LANZA: On the Robustness of Robustness Checks of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve 


























(lxxviii) This paper was presented at the Second International Conference on "Tourism and Sustainable 
Economic Development - Macro and Micro Economic Issues" jointly organised by CRENoS (Università 
di Cagliari and Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, and supported by the World Bank, 












  2006 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 